University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1987

At-Will Employment and the Handsome
American: A Case Study in Law and Social
Psychology
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/125

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "At-Will Employment and the Handsome American: A Case Study in Law and Social Psychology." Speech.
Los Angeles: UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, (November 1987).

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE SECOND ANNUAL BENJAMIN AARON LECTURE ON THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

At-Will Employment and the Handsome American:
A Case Study in Law and Social Psychology
Theodore J. St. Antoine

Co-sponsored by the UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations and the
Labor Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association

November 1987

Institute of Industrial Relations
Publications
University of California, Los Angeles, 90024-1478
@1988 by the Regents of the University of California
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America

In

r-

'" ..

•

•••

~lj(

.-

I

THE SECOND ANNUAL BENJAMIN AARON LECTURE ON THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

At-Will Employment and the Handsome American:
A Case Study in Law and Social Psychology
Theodore J. St. Antoine

Co-sponsored by the UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations and the
Labor Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association

November 1987

\

_.

The UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations
The Institute of Industrial Relations was created in 1945 by an Act of the California
legislature.
Institutes were established on two of the University's campuses -Berkeley and Los Angeles.
The IIR's mission is to serve all persons and groups
involved in industrial relations, whether they represent labor, management, government,
or the public. The UCLA Institute seeks to meet the needs of Southern California
one of the largest and still expanding industrial and commercial areas of the world.
Over the years, the Institute has achieved a nationwide, and in some areas a
worldwide, reputation through its research, education, and community services
programs.
Research is carried out by faculty drawn from various University
departments, and by Institute staff, on topics reflecting a broad range of interests and
expertise; research findings are disseminated through publications, conferences,
seminars, and special issue-oriented programs.
Community services programs are
carried out by specialized Centers within the Institute
the Center for Labor
Research and Education, the Center for Management Research and Education, and the
Center for Human Resource Management. In 1986 the Human Resources Round Table
(HAART) was established to join the expertise of DR staff and associated faculty and
senior human resource executives from major Southern California public and private
organizations.
For further information on IIR activitjes, programs, and publications, phone (213) 825-

4339.

The Benjamin Aaron Annual Lecture Series
The Benjamin Aaron Annual Lecture Series on the role of public policy in the
employment relationship was initiated in October 1986 under the joint sponsorship of
the UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations and the Labor Law Section of the Los
Angeles County Bar.
This series commemorates the career of Professor Emeritus
Benjamin Aaron, long-time director of the Institute and eminent scholar on the faculty
of the UCLA School of Law. Its purpose is to present the views of prominent scholars
on public policy issues of the day that relate to employment concerns.

BENJAMIN AARON, Professor of Law, Emeritus, School of Law, UCLA. Affiliated
with UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations since 1946 (Director, 1960-75) and with
the UCLA School of Law since 1960 as Professor of Law.
Chair, University of
California State-Wide Academic Senate (1980-81).
Chair, UCLA Academic Senate
(1970-7 1).
A.B., University of Michigan; LL.B., Harvard Law School.
Servke on
National War Labor Board (1942-45) and National Wage Stabilization Board (1951-52).
Extensive experience as arbitrator, mediator, and fact-finder in the private and
public sectors (1942-present).
Affiliations:
American Arbitration Association, Section
of Labor Relations and Employment Law (Secretary, 1967); Industrial Relations
Research Association (President, 1972); International Society for Labor Law and
Social Legislation (President, 1985-88); National Academy of Arbitrators (President,
1962).
Member:
International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts;
United Auto Workers Public Review Board.
Author of numerous publications on
domestic and comparative labor law and industrial relations.
THEODORE J . ST. ANTOINE, Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan, A.B.,
summa cum laude, Fordham College, 1951; J.D. University of Michigan Law School,
1954 (Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Law Review, 1953-54); post-graduate study in law and
economics, University of London, 1957-58 (Fulbright grant). Memberships: American
Bar Foundation.; Michigan Bar Foundation.; Order of the Coif; Phi Alpha Delta (law
fraternity); American Bar Association (past co-chairman, Committee on Practice and
Procedure under the NLRA; co-chairman, Committee on Practice and Procedure under
the NLRA; co-chairman, Committee on Individual Rights in the Workplace, 1981-84;
Secretary, 1969-70 and 1971-72, and Council member, 1984-present, Section of Labor
Relations Law); Industrial Relations Research Association; Panel of Labor Arbitrators,
American Arbitration Association; Panel of Arbitrators, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service; Advisory Employment Relations Committee of the Michigan Civil
Service Commission, 1972-73; United Automobile Workers Public Review Board, 1973present; Chairman, Michigan Governor's Workmen's Compensation Advisory Commtsswn, 1974-75; Governor's Special Counselor on Workers' Compensation, 1983-84;
President, National Resource Center for Consumers of Legal Services, 1974-78;
Committee Chairman, NLRB Task Force, 1975-77; Inti. Soc. for Labor Law & Social
Security (Executive Committee, 1984-present); National Academy of Arbitrators (Board
of Governors, 1985-present); Board of Trustees, Fordham University, 1978-84; State
Bar of Michigan (Judie. Qual. Comm., 1974-78; Chairperson, 1978-80, Labor Relations
Law Section; Chairperson, Scope and Correlation Committee, 1983-85); Faculty,
Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, Summer 1979; Board of Visitors, Duke Law
School, 1980-84; Chair, Administrative Committee, UAW-GM Legal Services Plan,
1982-present. Publications: Labor Relations Law: Cases and Materials (1968, 1974,
1979, 1984) with R. Smith, L. Merrifield & C. Craver; articles and papers in various
law reviews and in the proceedings of the N.Y.U., Midwest, and Southwestern labor
conferences and of the annual meetings of the American Bar Association, the
Industrial Relations Research Association, and the National Academy of Arbitrators.

AT -WILL EMPLOYMENT AND THE HANDSOME AMERICAN:
A CASE STUDY IN LAW AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Theodore J. St. Antoine•

I. Introduction

For a man as youthful and vibrant as Ben Aaron, it must come as a somewhat
chilling realization that he is now, in the considered judgment of his peers, the
reigning dean of American labor law scholars.

At the initiation of this series last

year, one of our most distinguished federal appellate judges, Harry Edwards, who to
the

best

of

my

knowledge

has

never

studied or

worked

extensively

with

Ben,

nonetheless pronounced Ben one of the four "heroes" whom he sought to emulate in his
own

work. 1

Whether

it

be

the

Industrial

Relations Research Association

or

the

National Academy of Arbitrators on the domestic scene, or the International Society
for Labor Law and Social Security on the worldwide scene, whenever academics and
practitioners in the employment field want a leader who will be a master of both
theory and practice, it is Ben Aaron whom they elect to head their organizations.

And

for all of us who toil in the vineyard of industrial relations, it is Ben Aaron who so
often sets the agenda -- just as he did in his magisterial inaugural lecture right here a
year ago.
At that time Ben outlined "two problems of immediate urgency" that he felt had
to be addressed, namely, plant closings and wrongful discharge. 2

Now, it would take a

more intrepid spirit than I to tackle the first topic, at least in Ben Aaron's own
backyard.

Ben has already done that subject to a fare-thee-wel1. 8

that in the meantime the U.S. Congress may have got the message.•

Besides, it appears
So tonight I shall

• James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I wish to
acknowledge the imaginative research assistance of Gregg Gilman and Claire Mercurio,
especially in collecting pertinent sociopsychological references.

deal with unjust dismissal, where the changes in legal doctrine surely constitute the
most important development in the whole field of employment law during the past
decade.

I am more honored than I can say by this opportunity to cover one of the

items on Ben's agenda.
Before proceeding, however, I should like to add a personal word.
than a highly esteemed professional colleague.

Ben is more

I am proud to count myself among

Ben's and his wife Eleanor's globe-girdling contingent of friends and acquaintances.

To

be a recipient of their hospitality is to experience something akin to Old World warmth
and graciousness.

Both of them are bon vivants in the very best sense, and their

enthusiasm for sharing their pleasures and discoveries has enriched the lives of many
of us.

I can only hope my presentation this evening will serve as a small token of my

regard for this splendid pair.

I might add that last year, with typical modesty but

uncharacteristic inaccuracy, Ben remarked that he was looking forward to seeing "abler
and more distinguished scholars" 5 succeeding him in this series.

I am confident that I

speak for many of those lecturers when I say that we shall be more than satisfied if
our contributions come close to meeting the high standards set by Ben Aaron.
The past decade has seen a genuine revolution in employment law, as some forty
American jurisdictions, in square holdings or strong dictum and on one or more diverse
theories, have modified the conventional doctrine whereby employers "may dismiss their
employees at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong." 6
In this paper I shall briefly review the theories most frequently invoked by the courts
in dealing

with

wrongful dismissal and

solution for the problem.

indicate their deficiencies as

a

permanent

Next, I shall summarize the major arguments for and against

the doctrine of employment at will.

Finally, I shall consider some of the particular

issues that will have to be resolved in any proposed legislation.

But first, to view the

whole question from a somewhat different perspective, I should like to look at a few
sociopsychological factors that may help explain why the United States remains today
the

last

major

industrial democracy in

the

world

without generalized

"just cause"

protections for its workers.
II. Social Psychology and the Handsome American
Americans are known as a generous and caring people.

If a natural disaster

occurs in India or Latin America, Americans can be counted on to rally around with
medical supplies and open pocketbooks.

We take such compassionate impulses almost
2

for granted; they go along with our image of ourselves as the perennial good guys, as
nature's noblemen.

But there may be some darker shadows in the picture.

occasion, condescending or patronizing attitudes may accompany our proffered aid.

On
In

the late 1950s William Lederer and Eugene Burdick wrote a novel about this country's
involvement in Southeast Asia that introduced a new phrase into popular usage -- "The
Ugly American."7 Significantly, for most persons, the term became shorthand for any
oafish, uncouth, irresponsible citizen abroad.

Our predisposition to regard the normal

cleancut American as the very embodiment of virtue blinded us to other possibilities.
In fact, the original ugly American was one of the heroes of the Lederer-Burdick book.

He spent his time out in the rice paddies helping the natives to help themselves.

The

handsome, well-manicured Americans stayed back in their isolated urban compounds,
drawing up grandiose but unrealistic plans for reshaping the countryside with giant
dams and sprawling factories.
Over the last few years I have struggled to reconcile the notion of a caring,
giving, open-hearted America with the resistance I have frequently encountered, even
in

many

traditionally

progressive

circles,

to

safeguards for this country's working persons.

the concept of universal

"just cause"

The image of Lederer and Burdick's

"handsome" Americans, who operated apart from the people they were purporting to
assist, and in ignorance of their real wants and needs, led me to indulge in some
amateur psychologizing about the more appealing and enduring mythic figures of our
history, and the lessons they might impart about our national character.

I discovered

that two of my own candidates as prototypical icons -- the self-sufficient frontiersman
and the hard-boiled private eye, two quintessential "loners"

have been taken quite

seriously as national symbols in one of the most influential of recent sociological
works, Habits of the Heart. 8

The authors draw on such figures from an earlier era as

James Fenimore Cooper's Deerslayer, the Lone Ranger, and the beleaguered sheriff in
High

Noon,

and

such solitary modern heroes as

the detectives Sam Spade, Philip

Marlowe, and Lew Archer to illustrate a central thesis of their book:
lies

at

the

very

core

of

American

culture."9

It

is,

however,

"Individualism
an

ambivalent

individualism, for it involves, as these scholars describe it, "a commitment to the equal
right to dignity of every individual combined with an effort to justify inequality of
reward, which, when extreme, may deprive people of dignity." 10
At its best, individualism produces Lederer and Burdick's ugly but achieving and
sharing

American;

at

its

worst,

as

a host

of sociologists

and

psychologists

have

demonstrated, excessive emphasis on personal responsibility can result in self-loathing
3

by the moderately successful and a "blaming of the victim" for his or her economic or
social woes. 11
the

relatively

Having failures around to identify and derogate may even be a way for
unsuccessful

to

justify

and

individualistic society is harsh and unforgiving.

themselves. 12

console

An

overly

Failure is invariably attributed to

personal fault and almost never to socioeconomic forces that may often be beyond
one's control.

In such a dog-eat-dog milieu, it will not be easy for the fired worker

to generate much sympathy for his claims of unjust treatment.
The centrality if not primacy of individualism in American life is hardly a new
discovery.

As early as the 1830s Tocqueville analyzed the phenomenon, but he gave it

only the worst of possible connotations:

"Individualism . . . disposes each citizen to

isolate himself from the mass of his fellows . . . . All a man's interests are limited to
those near himself." 13

In his classic 1893 essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in

American History," Frederick Jackson Turner declared that it is "to the frontier that
American

intellect

owes

its

striking

characteristics,"

individualism, working for good and for eviJ." 14

including

"that

dominant

In that prophetic work, An American

Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal commented on the "low degree of law observance" in the
United States, noting that the "authorities . . . will most often meet the citizen's
individualistic inclinations by trying to educate him to obey the law less in terms of
collective interest than in terms of self-interest." 15
The national psyches of Western Europe and especially of the Orient plainly differ
from ours, stressing interdependence over rugged individualism.

Thus, psychiatrist Irvin

Yalom contrasts Europe's "geographic and ethnic confinement, the greater familiarity
with

limits,

war,

death,

and

optimism, limitless horizons, and

uncertain

existence,"

pragmatism." 16

with

America's

"expansiveness,

Social psychologists point out that

training for independence begins earlier in the West, particularly in the United States,
than in

non-Western societies. 17

In Japan, specifically, "mature interdependence is

defined in terms of reciprocal responsibilities," so that an employee's "loyalty to the
firm is quite compatible with self-actualization." 18
The American brand of individualism is obviously not all bad.

It accounts in part

for those peculiar national traits of self-reliance, inventiveness, and sheer exuberance
that have frequently been the envy of the world.

And at widely separated but perhaps

equally critical stages in our history, as Tocqueville 19 and Myrdal 20 have observed, the
higher values of democracy -- such as political freedom and a concern for the public
welfare -- have prevailed over the grosser excesses of individualism.
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Perhaps it is not

too quixotic to hope that, given sufficient time for education and reflection , Americans
will appropriately reorder their values concerning the issue of employment at will.
III. Judicial Theories of Unjust Discharge

Let me now turn to a brief overview of the three principal theories employed by
the courts to modify the at-will employment doctrine, along with my reasons for
believing these theories are ultimately inadequate for the task.

The three theories

include tort -- violation of public policy, or "abusive" discharge; breach of an express
or implied contract; and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
A. Tort Theories

The courts have acted along a spectrum of public policy violations.

At one

extreme end employers have actually fired employees for refusing to commit a crime,
such as perjury21 or price-fixing. 22

I should like to think that we are past the point

when any court would countenance such an outrage.

Nexf along the spectrum are

cases where employees are discharged for performing a public duty, like serving on a
jury 23 or "blowing the whistle" on wrongdoing within a company. 2 "

Lastly, there are

dismissals for exercising a public right, such as filing a workers' compensation claim. 25
The first type of case, where criminal conduct is importuned, is going to be easy,
and also extremely rare.
"Public

After that, the issues will get tougher for the courts.

policy" is a slippery concept.

For example, it may be one thing if a

"whis.tleblower" has been subpoened to appear at an official inquiry.

It may be quite

another if he has taken it upon himself to share his good-faith but mistaken suspicions
with the media, seriously damaging his employer's reputation.

Some courts have simply

thrown up their hands over public policy claims, insisting such matters should be left
to

the

legislature. 26

Except

in

the

most

egregious

situations,

therefore,

judicial

theories of public policy are no sure answer to the problem of unfair dismissal.
Even more nebulous is the notion of "abusive" discharge.

One celebrated decision

sustained a suit by a female worker who was fired for refusing to date her foreman. 27
Other courts, however, have declined to remedy such personal abuse. 28

Moreover,

there is a growing tendency to require that the public policy relied upon be "clearly
articulated" and "well accepted,"29 or even that it be "evidenced by a constitutional or
statutory provision."80

That

will give small comfort to most employees

discharged spitefully or arbitrarily.
5

who are

B. Contract Theories

At one time an employer's oral assurance of "permanent" employment, or a policy
statement in a personnel manual that employees would be discharged only for just
cause, was not considered legally binding. 31

In the early 1980s, however, a number of

courts began taking employers at their word, and started treating such declarations as
express or implied contracts.32
statements

as

merely

But many courts continued to regard these employer

nonbinding

expressions

individual

promises of job security will

personnel,

and

only

the

of

present

intent.33

Furthermore,

probably be given only to

more enlightened employers are

policies applicable to employees generally.

likely

to

higher-ranking
issue

protective

Thus, the person who undoubtedly needs

these safeguards the most -- the rank-and-file worker in the marginal establishment -is the very one who will get the least.
Even where courts recognize the new contractual qualification on employment at
will, an employer can of course avoid liability by refraining from any assurances. 34
Clear and prominent disclaimers of any legal intent in an employee handbook will also
accomplish

the

purpose.36

Although

it

is

more

problematical,

I

also

believe

an

employer can ordinarily purge a manual of any guarantees against future terminations,
even as to incumbent employees.36
stuck forever

with

an

existing,

conditions worsened dramatically.

After all, one would not consider an employer

unilaterally

In short,

established

pay scale, even if economic

the contract exceptions to

the at-will

principle seem no panacea, either.
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Massachusetts and California have led the way in developing the most expansive
judicial qualification of the employment-at-will doctrine.

This modification is based on

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is said to inhere in every contract.
"Bad faith" has been found when a jury concluded an employer had dismissed an
employee to avoid paying him the full commission due on a multimillion-dollar sale, 37
and when an employer discharged a long-term employee without good cause. 38
novel use of the good faith concept appears contrary to its traditional function.

This
It

has not been regarded as applicable to contract termination as such, but rather to the
mutual obligation of the parties not to interfere with each other's performance or their
receipt of the benefits of the agreement. 89

My judgment is that most courts will

follow the New York Court of Appeals 40 in rejecting the good-faith covenant in this
context as fundamentally incompatible with the whole theory of at-will employment.
6

IV. The Case for Just Cause Legislation
About 60 million persons work in private sector, nonunion firms in the United
States,

and

thus

are

not

protected

against

unjust

dismissal

by

bargaining agreements or constitutional or civil service provisions.

either

collective

A careful scholar

has estimated that of this group, some two million nonprobationary employees are
discharged annually.
restored

to

their

He further calculates that about

jobs

if they

had

the same

J 50,000

of these would be

just cause protections

as

unionized

workers. 41 The problem is a substantial one, then, in terms of the numbers alone.
The courts of the more progressive states,
Michigan,

have

employment.

probably

neared

the

limits

of

like California, Massachusetts, and
their willingness

to

modify at-will

They will entertain suits alleging serious violations of accepted public

policy.

They will hold employers to their unretracted word not to fire except for good

reason.

But ordinarily they will not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to

prove just cause to support a discharge.

The next move therefore seems up to the

legislatures.
Conceptually, there appears little or nothing to be said in favor of an employer's
right to treat its employees arbitrarily or unfairly.
matter of simple justice.

42

For most commentators, it is a

Perhaps the most outspoken academic dissenter is Professor

Richard Epstein of Chicago.

He views at-will contracts as fair because they are the

product of freedom of contract between parties with equal bargaining power seeking a
mutually beneficial relationship. 43
diversi.fication,"

since

the

He even suggests that workers will profit from "risk

contract

investment in a single job."44

at

will

offsets

"the

concentration

of

individual

The Epstein thesis exudes the rarefied ozone of the

ivory tower, not the rank air of the plant floor.

His analysis admits of no living,

breathing human beings, who develop irrational antagonisms or exercise poor judgment,
on the one hand, or who suffer the psychological as well as the economic devastation
of

losing

a

job,

on

the

other.

Numerops

studies

document

the

increases

in

cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdow.Qs, alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse
and

child

abuse,

impair_ed

social

relationships,

and

various

other

diseases

and

abnormalities that develop even in the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting
from plant closings.45

Presumably such effects are at least as severe when a worker

is singled out to be discharged for some alleged incompetence or rule infraction.

Even

if Epstein were correct in all his statements about employees collectively, this searing
harm to individuals would stm justify eradicating the at-will principle.
7

This reform will probably come at some cost.

Many persons will naturally think

of the employer's loss of flexibility in its operations, and the need for extra staff in
the personnel office.

That will almost surely be a piece of the story, but it may not
One scholar has suggested a lower wage level could result

be the whole by any means.
because

the

more

stable

and

attractive

employment

situation

would cause

decrease in the demand for labor and an increase in the supply.

46

both

In effect, the

employees themselves would pay at least partially for their greater job security.
is a time-honored tradeoff among unionized
considered

inappropriate

here.

There

is

workers,4 7
also

a

That

however, and should not be

evidence

that

the

net

increase

in

employers' costs in maintaining a for-cause discharge system would not be exorbitant.
For example, in all the demands by unionized firms for "givebacks" or bargaining
concessions during the early 1980s, scarcely ever did employers seek to remove "just
cause" contract clauses, or the grievance and arbitration procedures to enforce them.
The "competitiveness" of American business in international markets should not be
markedly affected

by

the

elimination of at-will employment.

Statutory protection

against unfair discharge now exists in about sixty countries around the world, including
all of the Common Market, Sweden and Norway, Japan, and Canada. 48

We are the last

major holdout against the recommendations of the International Labor Organization in
1963 and again in 1982 that workers not be terminated except for a valid reason.
Furthermore, experience both here and abroad suggests that the prevention of arbitrary
treatment

of

employees

may

be

good

business

as

well

as

humane.

Significant

correlations have been shown between a secure work force and high productivity and
quality output. 49
A more rational, systematic method of dealing with wrongful terminations would
save many employers the crushing financial liability imposed by emotionally aroused
juries under our existing, capricious common-law regime.

For example, separate studies

at different times by a plaintifrs attorney 50 and a management attorney51 in California
indicated that plaintiffs won between 78 and 90 percent of the cases that went to
juries, with the awards averaging between $425,000 and $450,000.

Jury awards for

single individuals have gone as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, and $2.57
million. 62

Eventually,

an

informed

employer

lobby

might

well

conclude

that

comprehensive just cause legislation, which would exclude jury verdicts and punitive
damages, was the more favorable alternative.
There are signs, indeed, of some movement, glacial though it is.

Bills forbidding

wrongful discharge have been introduced in a dozen or more legislatures. 58
8

In addition

to the positive recommendations of the special committee of the California Bar's Labor
and Employment Law Section, 54 the individual rights committee of the ABA Section on
Labor and Employment Law has drafted a questionnaire regarding the critical issues to
be considered in any proposed law. 65

The AFL-CIO's Executive Council has ended

organized labor's longstanding ambivalence on the subject by endorsing the concept of
wrongful

discharge

legislation. 66

The Commissioners on

Uniform

State Laws have

And this past summer Montana became the first

decided to draft a model statute.

state to adopt a comprehensive law protecting employees against unjust discharge. 67
V. Statutory Proposals

Ben Aaron himself has provided us with a road map of the subjects that must be
covered in writing legislation to deal with wrongful termination. 68
detours, I shaH be happy to follow his directions.
uniform federal law.

With a few minor

Ideally, we should probably have a

But the political climate is such that legislation in some of the

more receptive states seems the most feasible course for the foreseeable future.
A. Coverage

the

In

higher

ranges

of

management,

one

official's

evaluation

of

another's

business judgment may become so intertwined with questions of fair treatment that the
two cannot be separated.

These top executives should be excluded from coverage.

On

the other hand, shop foremen and supervisors who are not protected by the National
Labor Relations Act because they are management's representatives with rank-and-file
employees

do

not

present

such

safeguards, and should be covered.

potential

conflicts

of

interest

under

just

cause

Several proposed bills draw the line by excepting

persons entitled to a pension above a certain amount, or persons with a fixed-term
contract of two years or more.

Probationary employees may also be excluded.

months is a common probation period but a California bill specifies two years.69

Six
That

is the sort of quantitative issue which lends itself to compromise.
Small employers may be more prone to arbitrariness and individual spite than
large, structured corporations.

But we hesitate to intrude into the sometimes intensely

personal relationships of tiny establishments.
outset,

would seem

A suitable dividing line, at least at the

to be employers having between ten 60 and fifteen61

employees.

9

or more

Public employees generally have constitutional guarantees against the deprivation
of their "vested" job interests without due process.

About half also have more specific

civil service or tenure protections against unjust dismissal.

It would seem sensible to

adopt the approach of several bills in limiting new protections to private industry.
I see no principled grounds for treating organized employees differently from the
unorganized

with

respect to

basic statutory safeguards.

If workers in general are

entitled to invoke a just cause standard, the same public policy should arguably apply
to

all,

regardless

agreements.

the

existence of

parallel

protections

in

collective

bargaining

Federal precedent for such an approach exists in both the NLRA and civil

rights legislation.
laws,62

of

Nonetheless, there would be federal preemption problems with state

and procedural problems in accommodating contractual and statutory rights. 63

There may be much practical wisdom in the solution of several bills to finesse all these
complications by excluding unionized employees.
B.

Standard Applicable and Discipline Affected
My proposal would be to articulate a standard for discharge or discipline in terms

of "just cause" or equivalent language, without further definition but perhaps with a
few illustrative reasons.

Even in Western Europe, which had nothing like the body of

American arbitral precedent to draw upon, there has apparently been little difficulty in
applying broadly phrased statutory criteria.
under inclusiveness.

Any effort at specificity is bound to risk

Decisionmakers should be able to flesh out "just cause" much as

have our arbitrators.
Outright discharge,

the so-called "capital punishment" of industrial relations, is

the usual target of all these proposals.

But an extended suspension, a demotion, or an

onerous job assignment can be almost as bad.
shop discipline to governmental review.
"constructive" discharge as weu.s.t

Yet we shrink from subjecting every

The solution of several bills is to cover

An employee who feels sufficiently aggrieved may

quit, and then test the legitimacy of the employer conduct that triggered his or her
departure.
C. Enforcement Procedures
Administration and enforcement of new just cause legislation will have to be
lodged

in

the

courts,

administrative agencies.

or

in

existing

or

newly

created

executive

departments

or

I would join most persons in ruling out the courts as too

formal, too costly, and too slow.

Beyond that, I think the locus of administration is
10

less

significant

arbitration

than

model.

whether
With

we

a

follow

the

unanimity

hearing

rare

among

officer-agency
their

contentious

arbitrators confronting the issue have invariably opted for arbitration.
my colleagues.

model

or

tribe,

the
those

I go along with

I like to think our dockets are already so bulging that we could not

possibly be impelled by crass commercial considerations; I do believe there are valid,
objective reasons for our choice.
The arbitration format would immediately make available the vast body of arbitral
precedent concerning substance and procedure that has been developed in countless
decisions over the years.

It would permit the use of an established nucleus of

experienced arbitrators, and of the growing
Robben

Fleming

acceptable

demonstrated

decisions,

some

especially

in

years

number of young, able aspirants who
ago

the

more

are

objectively

straightforward

qualified

to

disciplinary

render
cases. 65

Arbitration would facilitate maximum flexibHity, at least until more is learned about
future caseloads, because there would be no need to engage a large permanent staff at
the beginning.

The relative informality and speed of arbitration -- though both of

those qualities are
employees.

too often much eroded

-- should also appeal to rank-and-file

One drawback of arbitration for employees, however, might be that, in

keeping with the pattern in the unionized sector, and in recognition of the strained
financial resources of most states, the parties themselves would have to bear the cost
of the arbitrator.
It would seem highly desirable to have some screening mechanism in the statutory

procedure to avoid a flood of hearings.

The most obvious would be a preliminary

mediation stage of minimum duration, as provided by California and Michigan bills.66
One knowledgeable observer would have an official in the administering agency make a
"reasonble

cause"

determination

before a

case

could go

to

arbitration. 67

Such a

requirement would be especially appropriate if the state was to bear a major share of
the cost of the proceedings.

The arbitrator's award itself should be final and binding,

without the need for agency adoption or review as in the case of a hearing officer's
report or decision.
arbitration award

Ordinarily, of course, the courts will not set aside a private
unless the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction or the award

obtained by fraud, bribery, or similar

means. 68

was

Those criteria ought to apply here.

D. Remedies

Remedies for unjust discharge in the United States have traditionally included
reinstatement, with or without back pay.

In Europe reinstatement is the exception.
11

Apparently

it is felt that future relations between the employer and the unwanted

employee will be too strained, and that the employee is better off to leave with a flat
severance

payment.

reinstatement

is

A

number

unfeasible

of

without

American

the

experts

presence of a

also

seem

labor

union

to

believe

to

that

support

the

I believe an award of severance pay in lieu of reinstatement should

restored employee.

be an option available to the arbitrator.

But I would not preclude reinstatement out of

excessive solicitude for the employee.

A reinstatement order may also furnish extra

bargaining

leverage

to

the

tradeoff

for

employee in negotiating any

future

settlement

with

the

employer.
The

employers

would

be

the

elimination

of

jury

verdicts,

compensatory and punitive damages, awards for pain and mental suffering, and the like.
Something

rather

analogous

occurred

in

the

second

decade

of

this

century,

when

employers swapped their powerful common law defenses to tortious injury of employees
in

the

workplace in

return for

the no-fault workers' compensation system and its

denial of compensatory and punitive damages.

Despite some occasional creaks in the

joints, workers' compensation has generally served us well.
precedent

for

mutual

accommodations

in

our

present

It may stand as a salutary
deliberations

over

wrongful

dismissal.
VI. Conclusion

The social psychologists - - and the medical diagnosticians -- are only beginning
to assess the full meaning of the loss of a job.
profound

values

are

at stake,

not

At least we can now perceive that

just economic

hardship.

Beyond the

clinically

observable symptoms of impaired, even shattered, minds and bodies, there is a genuine
' question of identity involved.

Studies

have found

that "most, if not all, working

people tend to describe themselves in terms of the work groups or organizations to
which

they belong.

related response
classes:

The question 'Who are you?' often elicits an organizationally
. Occupational role is usually a part of this response for all

'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm a lawyer.'"69

To lose one's job is, in a true

sense, to risk one's very being.
Rugged individualists though we may be, Americans eventually -- if sometimes
belatedly -- recognize moral and social imperatives.

In my view, reform of wrongful

termination has now assumed that status, and I am confident we shall respond.
do not expect a widespread response any time soon.
12

But I

It took us some fifty years longer

than that hardly liberal statesman, Chancellor Bismarck of Germany, to see the need
for Social Security.

On that timetable, counting from the ILO's initial call for just

cause legislation in 1963, we shall have accomplished the task by the year 2013.
only hope that Ben

Aaron and

I shall

I can

be together then

if not in Southern

California, then in some even airier and more pellucid region

and Ben will uncork

one of his favorite vintages. And the two of us shall share a toast.
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Randle, and Sonja Sackmann, 1987 (Monograph and Research Series No. 46, 490 pages,
$20).
The Future Directions of Employee Relations, edited by Eric G. Flamholtz,
Felicitas Hinman, 1985 (Monograph and Research Series No. 45, 418 pages, $17).

with

Academic Unionism in British Universities, by Archie Kleingartner and Evelyn Hunt,
1986 (Monograph and Research Series No. 44, 161 pages, $10).
California Farm Labor Relations and Law, edited by Walter Fogel, 1985 (Monograph and
Research Series No. 41, 225 pages, $10).
1987 EEO Updates on: Sexual Harassment; Affirmative Action; and California Threshold
Issues (Current Issues Series Nos. 5 ($5), 6 ($5), and 7 ($3), respectively).
Current Issues in Employee Benefits (Current Issues Series No. 4, $8.00).
Taking on General Motors: A Case Study of the UAW Campaign To Keep GM Van
Nuys Open, by Eric Mann, 1987 (408 pages, $20).
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